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I. INTRODUCTION: RHETORIC AND REALITY

Our interest is in medical malpractice as an area of specialized
practice for plaintiffs' lawyers, and we want to explore this area
because plaintiffs' lawyers are key actors in the medical malpractice
system. An understanding of their role is necessary in identifying
what problems may exist in this system and in evaluating both
proposed and enacted solutions. Indeed, some reforms appear to be
specifically aimed at plaintiffs' lawyers who handle medical
malpractice cases-especially the repeat players whose experience and
expertise may give them, and hence their clients, a strategic
advantage.
Like most of the political rhetoric surrounding medical
malpractice, the characterization of lawyers representing plaintiffs
has always been vivid, symbolically charged, and divorced from
reality. The rhetoric's purpose, of course, is not to present an accurate
picture of reality.
The idea is to gain political advantage by
portraying such lawyers in the most negative light and to blame them
for a host of ills curable only by medical malpractice reform. Writing
in 1991, Randall Bovbjerg and his colleagues summarized the medical
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community's views, saying that physicians believe there is systematic
jury bias against them.1 Physicians also believe that "[bjecause
malpractice plaintiffs receive extravagant amounts in malpractice
cases, their contingent-fee lawyers also earn too much-far more than
needed to assure competent representation. Hence, the lawyers are
willing to take even more and weaker cases to trial in the hopes of
hitting the 'jackpot."' 2 Herein, supposedly, lies the gist of the problem.
The "greedy, opportunistic lawyer" characterization leaves
little room for a perspective that recognizes sophisticated
specialization by plaintiffs' lawyers. Such an alternative perspective
would require us to view malpractice differently, because it calls into
question both the "jackpot lawyer" as a key cause of the "malpractice
crisis" and what this theory presumes about the malpractice system.
Specialization in malpractice cannot be built on a "jackpot" system of
weak cases and jury sympathy, because malpractice cases are
complex, expensive, and risky. Instead, a successful practice is built
on the development of expertise and the strategic advantages that
come from being a repeat player, rather than an infrequent "jackpot"
player. Success comes with the development of advantages sufficient
to offset the strategic advantages of the insurance companies and
their lawyers, who are the epitome of repeat players. In fact, the
existence of specialists itself calls into question the veracity of the
"jackpot" characterization of the malpractice system.
While not necessarily adopting the political rhetoric's
characterization of plaintiffs' lawyers, the academic literature also
suggests that the kind of specialization we have in mind will not exist
on the plaintiffs' side. For instance, Bovbjerg and his co-authors argue
that because malpractice cases are complex, expensive to prepare, and
very risky, plaintiffs' lawyers-as rational actors-will be deterred
from specializing in the area. In order to maximize their return in a
risky and expensive environment, plaintiffs' lawyers will invest
instead in different kinds of cases based on likely jury sympathy, only
some of which will involve malpractice. 3 Herbert Kritzer makes a
similar argument in his book regarding lawyers in Wisconsin who rely
on the contingency fee. 4 He leaves out consideration of jury sympathy,
but he also argues that lawyers will act rationally and build their
practices around a diverse portfolio of cases rather than specialize in
1.
Randall Bovbjerg et al., Juries and Justice: Are Malpracticeand Other PersonalInjuries
Created Equal?, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 16-17, 31-33 (1991).
2.
Id. at 16-17.
3.
Id. at 12, 35-36.
4.
HERBERT KRITZER, RISKS, REPUTATIONS, AND REWARDS: CONTINGENCY FEE PRACTICE IN
THE UNITED STATES 45-95 (2004).
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an area with considerable risk and uncertainty and in which their
compensation is based on a percentage of the award. 5 Indeed, it is
unclear why any rational actor, from this perspective, would ever
handle a malpractice case.
In his classic 1974 article on repeat players and the reasons
that the "haves" come out ahead, Marc Galanter is also not optimistic
about the development of specialization on the plaintiffs' side,
although for different reasons. 6 He suggests that repeat players such
as insurance companies "can buy legal services more steadily, in
larger quantities, in bulk[,] . ..and at higher rates [and, as a result,]
get services of better quality."7 In addressing the possibility of
specialization on the plaintiffs' side, Galanter asks:
Might we not expect the existence of specialization to offset RP [repeat players]
advantages by providing OS [one-shotters] with a specialist who in pursuit of his own
career goals would be interested in outcomes that would be advantageous8 to a whole
class of OSs? Does the specialist become the functional equivalent of an RP?

Galanter's answer to his own question is no. Such plaintiff-side
specialists, he writes, will have problems in developing optimizing
strategies because they cannot use the repeat player's long-term
strategy of trading-off short-term gains for longer-term benefits. 9
More importantly, because of the low state of information among "oneshotters," they will have problems mobilizing a clientele. There is
simply no reason, Galanter asserts, for one-shotters to know who the
real specialists are. 10
In contrast, we believe that there can be specialized practice on
the plaintiffs' side, at least with regard to medical malpractice. To
explore this possibility, we will utilize three different data sets to
answer three basic questions about such specialization. The first
question is the simplest and most straightforward: do repeat playing
lawyers exist on the plaintiffs' side with regard to medical malpractice
claims? In any given data set on medical malpractice matters, are
5.
Id.
6.
Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REV. 95, 114-19 (1974).
7.

Id. at 114.

8.
Id. at 115.
9.
Id. at 117.
10. Id. at 116-17. In fairness, we are not saying that Galanter would necessarily answer his
own question the same way today. Because his 1974 article and its logic have had such an
enormous impact on socio-legal scholarship, however, we think the original argument deserves to
be empirically evaluated, rather than dismissed out of hand. The interesting question for us is
whether Galanter's answer may have indeed been empirically correct in the mid-1970s, but is
not in 2006. If so, the question becomes one of what allowed for the development of such
specialization over the past thirty years. Answering this question, however, must wait for
another article.
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there some lawyers who will appear on the plaintiffs' side more often
than other lawyers? If the answer is yes, we also want to know if
these lawyers appear to have developed any strategic advantages, as
evidenced in the data by a higher rate of successful verdicts and by
higher awards as compared to other lawyers. To answer this first set
of questions, we will use a closed medical malpractice insurance
claims data set from Wisconsin covering the years 1976 to 1988.11
The second question compliments the first, but asks more
specifically about the plaintiffs' lawyers themselves, rather than the
malpractice matters they handle. In a data set on plaintiffs' lawyers
(not malpractice matters), what proportion of lawyers handle any
medical malpractice matters at all? Based on the amount of medical
malpractice handled, are there lawyers whose business consists
primarily of medical malpractice matters-lawyers we could call
specialists? If so, what do their practices look like? To answer this
second question, we will use survey data on Texas plaintiffs' lawyers
from 2000 (hereinafter the "Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey") and interview
data involving plaintiffs' lawyers in Texas covering the years 1997 to
2005.12
The third question asks specifically about the mobilization
problem posed by Galanter-that would-be specialists have problems
mobilizing a clientele because of the low state of information among
"one-shotters." Without a reliable and steady source of clients, there
can be no specialization. How do medical malpractice specialists
mobilize a clientele in light of the one-shot plaintiffs' information
problem? How do they get their cases? To answer this question, we
will use some of the same data used for the second question along with
data from a State Bar of Texas survey done in 2004 involving referral

11. See WIs. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF INSURANCE, WISCONSIN HEALTH CARE LIABILITY
INSURANCE PLAN (WHCLIP): PRELIMINARY REPORT ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE IN WISCONSIN 1,

13 (1992) [hereinafter WHCLIP REPORT].
12. See Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Texas Two-Step: Evidence on the Link
Between Damage Caps and Access, 55 DEPAUL L,REV. 635 (2006) [hereinafter Daniels & Martin,
Texas Two-Step]; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53
EMORY L.J. 1225 (2004) [hereinafter Daniels & Martin, Strange Success]; Stephen Daniels &
Joanne Martin, It Was the Best of Times, It Was the Worst of Times: The PrecariousNature of
Plaintiffs' Practice in Texas, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1781 (2002) [hereinafter Daniels & Martin, It Was
the Best of Times]; Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, 'The Impact That It Has Had Is Between
People's Ears:" Tort Reform, Mass Culture, and Plaintiffs' Lawyers, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 453
(2001); Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, "It's Darwinism - Survival of the Fittest" How
Markets and Reputations Shape the Ways in Which Plaintiffs'Lawyers Obtain Clients, 21 LAW &
POL'Y 377 (1999) [hereinafter Daniels & Martin, It's Darwinism]. A detailed description of our
methodology can be found in Daniels & Martin, It Was the Best of Times, supra, methodological
app., at 1826-28.
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practices among lawyers in Texas (hereinafter the "Texas Referral
Survey").13
Ideally, all of the data used would be from the same place and
time period, rather than two states and two time periods. This
approach, however, is not possible for Texas, our primary research
focus. 14 The major benefit of the Wisconsin data is that they include
information on the identity of the claimant's attorney as well as the
identity of the defendant's attorney.
Despite their obvious
shortcomings, the Wisconsin data do allow us to answer a basic
question about repeat players on the plaintiffs' side, the answer to
which may be generally applicable. If so, there are some things we
would expect to find in the Texas data, including clear evidence of
specialization and a solution to the mobilization problem.
II. Do REPEAT PLAYERS EXIST?
The Wisconsin closed claims data we will use in addressing this
threshold question come from a major study of medical malpractice
insurance conducted by the Wisconsin Office of the Commissioner of
Insurance in 1988-89.15 It sought to cover all medical malpractice
claims closed in the state between 1976 and 1988.16 The most
complete and useful data from that study are those for the Wisconsin
Health Care Liability Insurance Plan ("WHCLIP"), which was a state-

13. DEP'T OF RESEARCH & ANALYSIS, STATE BAR OF TEX., TEXAS REFERRAL PRACTICES
SURVEY REPORT
(2004),
available at http://www.texasbar.com/Template.cfm?Section=
Research-and-Anaysis&Tempate=/ContentManagement/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=1206
0 [hereinafter TEXAS REFERRAL SURVEY]. The survey was sent to a random sample of 4,000
active in-state members of the State Bar of Texas in the spring of 2004. Texas is a mandatory bar
state, so this sample represents all active lawyers in the state. Of the 4,000 surveys sent, 1,215
completed surveys were returned (or 30.4%). This level of response means a confidence interval
of plus or minus three percentage points at the 95% significance level. Id. at 3-5. For a
description of the survey's methodology, see id. at 3-7. The specific data used in this Article are
on file with the authors; the analyses reported in this Article were conducted by the authors and
represent only their interpretations and not those of the State Bar of Texas or the Referral Fee
Task Force.
14. Closed claims data are available for Texas, and those data do say whether or not a
claimant was represented by an attorney. Unfortunately, the data do not include the necessary
information on the lawyers' identity. See generally Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis:
Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207
(2005).
15. See WHCLIP REPORT, supra note 11.
16. See Stephen Daniels et al., Why Kill All the Lawyers? Repeat Players and Strategic
Advantage in Medical Malpractice Claims 15 (Am. Bar Found., Working Paper No. 9210, 1993)
[hereinafter Daniels et al., Why Kill All the Lawyers]. The start date was chosen because
Wisconsin first enacted legislation on medical malpractice reforms in 1975. The study was
intended to cover all insurance carriers operating in Wisconsin during the 1976-1988 time
period. See id. at 13-17; see also WHCLIP REPORT, supra note 11, at 1.
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backed insurance plan administered by Wausau Insurance
Company. 17 For the 1976-88 time period, WHCLIP closed a total of
2,904 claims in which a legal claim was filed as a result of a patient's
assertion of a claim for monetary damages.1 8 Data on the plaintiffs
lawyer can be found in 2,736 claims, and 728 different plaintiffs'
lawyers or firms appeared.19 For the purposes of this Article, we have
chosen to ignore time and analyze the data set as a whole, as one or
even a few years will not capture the existence of repeat players.
The largest number of lawyers appeared only once on the
plaintiffs' side in the WHCLIP data (349 of 728, or 47.9%), and most
appeared fewer than 10 times (676, 92.9%).
However, these
infrequently appearing lawyers do not account for an equivalent
percentage of claims. While making up the vast majority of listed
lawyers, they account for just 55.5 percent of the claims in which a
lawyer appears. The 52 lawyers who appear 10 times or more make
up only 7.1 percent of lawyers, but account for 44.5 percent (1218 of
2736) of the claims. As Table 1 shows, four attorneys appear more
than 50 times, and they account for 16.1 percent (440) of the claims.
Two of them appear over 100 times (107 and 168) and account for 10.1
percent of the claims. As indicated in Table 1, more frequently
appearing attorneys handle more severe injuries, are more successful,
20
and win higher awards for their clients.

17. Daniels et al., Why Kill All the Lawyers, supra note 16, at 16. WHCLIP was the largest
malpractice carrier in the state at the time and had the broadest book of business covering
hospitals, physicians, and other health care professionals. As the state-backed carrier, it had to
write insurance for all risk levels and specialties. See id at 15-16; WHCLIP REPORT, supra note
11, at 1-2. WHCLIP reported data for the study on all closed claims for the years 1976-1988. Onsite verification of the data collection showed the quality of these to be quite high, due in large
part to a vigorous system of reliability checks used by WHCLIP managers. Daniels et al., Why
Kill All the Lawyers, supra note 16, at 16.
18. WHCLIP closed a total of 6,727 claims for the years 1976-1988. Of these, 3,831 (56.9%)
were incident reports in which no legal claim was filed and in which the patient did not assert a
claim for money. In these situations, a file was opened after WHCLIP had been contacted by the
insured concerning an incident and a potential claim. Some minimal follow-up was done by
WHCLIP personnel, and if the patient did nothing the claim was closed in six to eight months.
The claim would be reopened later if the patient decided to pursue the matter. Id. at 16-17.
19. Sixty-two claims were literally listed as pro se, and another 98 claims had no attorney
listed. A total of 728 different attorneys or firms appeared in the 2,736 claims. If the closed claim
file did not list a firm name for the claimant's attorney, the Wisconsin Legal Directory was
consulted to see if the attorney was working in a firm at the time. If so, the appearance was
counted as a firm appearance rather than an individual appearance. If there was no firm
affiliation at the time, the appearance was counted as the individual's appearance. An
appearance was a claim handled. Id. at 17-18.
20. The difference in success is statistically significant (Fisher's Exact, sig. at .00);
difference in injury level is statistically significant (chi square at .00); and the difference in
award is also statistically significant (difference of means, sig. at .00).
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Table 1
Plaintiffs' Lawyers: All Appearances
(WHCLIP Closed Claims 1976-88) 21
Appearances

Claims

Lawyers

1-50

2296

51+

440

Success
Rate

Median Injury
Severity

724

30.7%

4

47.5%

Mean
Award

Median
Award

4

$75,000

$15,000

6

$173,000

$67,000

Because more serious injuries bring higher awards, the higher
awards for the more frequently appearing lawyers in Table 1 may
simply be a product of the more serious injuries they handle (we will
leave to the next Part the question of why they handle more of such
matters). If these lawyers have developed some level of expertise and
strategic advantage compared to other lawyers, however, we would
expect them to be more successful and to win higher awards holding
severity of injury constant. Table 2 supports this hypothesis by
comparing lawyers with 50 or fewer appearances to those with more
than 50 appearances.

21. Definitions of some table values:
Total N of Claims with an attorney: 2,736 (1-50, 2296 claims and 50+, 440 claims)
Success Rate: Percentage of claims closed with a monetary award
Median Injury Severity: Median injury using the following scale:
1. emotional only
2. temporary insignificant: lacerations, minor scars, rash
3. temporary minor: infections, misset fracture, fall, recovery delayed
4. temporary major: burns, drug side effect, recovery delayed
5. permanent minor: loss of fingers, non-disabling injuries
6. permanent significant: deafness, loss of eye, loss of limb
7. permanent major: paraplegia, blindness, loss of two limbs, brain damage
8. permanent grave: quadriplegia, severe brain damage, life-long care
9. death
Mean and Median Award: Award in successful claims expressed in 1988 dollars (last
year included in data) and rounded to the nearest thousand
Injury scale taken from NAT'L ASS'N OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, MALPRACTICE
CLAIMS: FINAL COMPILATION 10 (1980).
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Table 2
Injury Levels and Plaintiffs' Lawyers Appearances
(1-50 appearance = 724 lawyers; 51+ = 4 lawyers)
Temporary Injury
Appearances

N of Claims

Success Rate

Mean Award

Med

1-50

1223

29.6%

$30,063

$6,OC

51+

152

46.7%

$58,137

$23,C

Permanent Injury
Appearances

N of Claims

Success Rate

1-50

714

31.2%

$149,508

$38,000

51+

198

47.5%

$248,229

$116,000

Appearances

N of Claims

Success Rate

Mean Award

Median Award

1-50

352

33.8%

$71,235

$20,000

51+

90

48.9%

$196,915

$107,000

Mean Award

Median Award

Death

Table 2 compares three different levels of severity taken from a
collapsed version of the same scale used on Table 1 and explained in
footnote 21. Temporary injury includes levels 1 through 4 of that
scale, and permanent injury includes levels 5 through 8. In each
scenario, the more frequently appearing lawyers win more often and
achieve higher awards. 22 In addition, the more frequently appearing
attorneys concentrate on the more serious injuries. These lawyers
account for 11.1 percent of temporary injuries, 21.7 percent of
permanent injuries, and 20.4 percent of death cases while accounting
for less than 1 percent of the lawyers. More tellingly, these lawyers
account for 34.1 percent of level 8 permanent grave injuries-the most
serious level short of death.
While repeat playing is evident on the plaintiffs side, it is
prominent on the defense side. The vast majority of claims are
handled by defense lawyers appearing more than 50 times (2,223 of
2,872 claims in which a defense attorney could be identified-77.4%).
22. In each of the tables, the relationship between appearances and success is statistically
significant (Fisher's Exact, sig. at 01), as is the relationship between appearances and award size
(difference of means, sig. at .05).
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As Galanter would remind us, insurance carriers have ongoing
relationships with defense lawyers who develop substantial expertise
in particular areas of medical malpractice. Only 26 defense lawyers
(1.2% of all cases with an identifiable defense lawyer) appear once,
and 93 (4.2%) appear fewer than 10 times. The comparable figures for
plaintiffs' lawyers are 47.9 percent and 92.9 percent, respectively.
The key question with regard to strategic advantage asks what
happens when lawyers with different appearance rates face each
other. Generally speaking, we would expect the advantage to be in
favor of the defense, and this effect is best seen in Table 3 in those
situations in which 1-50-appearance defense lawyers face 1-50appearance plaintiffs' lawyers and when 50+-appearance defense
lawyers face 1-50-appearance plaintiffs' lawyers (the first and third
rows in the table). These two pairings have the lowest claimant
success rates in Table 3.23
Table 3
Plaintiff Success Rate by Appearance Pairings
(WHCLIP Closed Claims 1976-88)
Appearance Pairing

N of Claims

Plaintiff Success Rate

Def 1-50 v. Pf 1-50
Def 1-50 v. Pf 50+
Def 50+ v. Pf 1-50

552
71
1736
367
168

31.2%
57.7%
30.5%
45.5%
50.0%

Def 50+ v. Pf 50+
Def 100+ v. Pf 100+

The other pairings set out in Table 3 suggest that more
frequently appearing plaintiffs' attorneys may indeed have developed
a strategic advantage compared to their less frequently appearing
peers. 24 Though relatively few in number, this effect is most evident
in the second row in the table, where more frequently appearing
plaintiffs' lawyers (50+ appearances) face less frequently appearing
defense lawyers (1-50 appearances). The success for claimants in
these situations is 57.7 percent. When specialists on both sides face
each other-the fourth row in the table--the plaintiffs' lawyers do
23. The difference in success rate is not statistically significant. This is what we would
expect, since less frequently appearing plaintiffs' attorneys will have little strategic advantage
and should fare poorly in any situation.
24. The difference in success rate between less frequently and more frequently appearing
plaintiffs' lawyer situations are all statistically significant (Fisher's Exact, sig. at .001). This is
what we would expect if the more frequently appearing attorneys have developed some degree of
strategic advantage.
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relatively well compared to their peers in the first and third rows.
Perhaps the most telling evidence of strategic advantage is evident in
those cases when 100+ appearance lawyers on both sides (the superspecialists) face each other. There were two such specialists on the
plaintiffs' side and eight on the defense side. The plaintiff success rate
is 50 percent-exactly what we might expect to see if lawyers on both
sides, not just the defense side, have developed a strategic advantage.
In summary, we can answer our first question by saying that
there are repeat-playing lawyers on the plaintiffs' side in the medical
malpractice arena, but they are few in number compared to the
defense side. Because these repeat players are successful more often
than their less frequently appearing peers and win higher awards, we
can say that they have developed some amount of strategic advantage.
Can we really characterize these repeat players as medical
malpractice specialists? The next Part addresses this question.
III. Do SPECIALISTS EXIST?
To characterize some set of plaintiffs' lawyers as specialists in
medical malpractice means saying that they concentrate a significant
proportion of their practices on medical malpractice matters while
most of their plaintiffs' lawyer peers do not. Our research on plaintiffs'
lawyers in Texas indicates that medical malpractice specialists do in
fact exist. We found lawyers who consciously see themselves as
medical malpractice specialists, almost to the exclusion of other types
of cases. One such lawyer, whose firm is "80% to 85% medical
malpractice," told us in an interview, "It's probably been ...seven or
eight years since we had a straight-up, pure products liability case,
seat belt case, or rollover case .... An aviation case, for example,
would never come to this firm and probably shouldn't."2 5 It is equally
important to note that we also found lawyers who handle little or no
malpractice business.
In the Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey, usable data on caseload
composition is available for 541 of the 554 respondents. Just over onehalf of these 541 respondents (295, or 54.4%) report handling no
medical malpractice cases. This is easy to understand. Medical
25. All lawyers quoted in this Article were interviewed as a part of our Texas research.
Promises of confidentiality prevent us from identifying them. Our research involves ninety-six
in-depth interviews with Texas plaintiffs' lawyers conducted in the late 1990s and a major mail
survey of Texas plaintiffs' lawyers administered in late 1999/early 2000. Our research continues.
We are currently in the process of interviewing plaintiffs' lawyers in Texas again: in recent
months, we have conducted thirty-five of fifty planned interviews. In addition, as of this writing
another mail survey of Texas plaintiffs' lawyers is in the field and approximately 330 lawyers
have responded.
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malpractice cases are complex, risky, and expensive to prepare, and
many lawyers working on a contingency fee do not have the expertise
or resources to handle such cases. As a non-specialist San Antonio
lawyer noted, "[M]alpractice cases are really expensive to develop...
[A]nyone can take a car wreck case and try it, but for the medical
26 Of
malpractice cases you've got to know more about the medicine."
course, the contingency fee lawyer recoups none of the money spent on
the case and receives no fee for his/her time if there is no award. As
an illustration, one such lawyer said, "I just handled a trial case down
in Houston that I lost $50,000 on and didn't get paid a fee."
Table 4 shows that even of those lawyers in the Plaintiffs'
Lawyer Survey who report handling some medical malpractice
matters, most pursue relatively few. For those who handled at least
one malpractice matter at the time of the survey, the median
percentage of their business made up by malpractice is 10 percent
For 90 percent of these respondents, malpractice
(mean 24.0%).
80 percent of their business. Still, there are a
than
less
comprises
small number of respondents for whom medical malpractice makes up
the majority of the matters handled. For 46 lawyers, malpractice
comprises 50 percent or more of their business. These are the lawyers
we consider the specialists.
Table 4
Texas Plaintiffs' Lawyers
Medical Malpractice as a Percentage of Business
(respondents with at least one med mal case, N=246)
Percent of Business
1-24%
25-49%

N of Respondents
171
29

Percent of Respondents
69.5%
11.8%

50-74%

18

7.3%

75-100%

28

11.4%

Because malpractice cases are complex, risky, and expensive to
handle, this kind of substantive focus requires specialists to pay
particular attention to the economics. As a result, we would expect
26. The remarks of a Houston lawyer with a substantial litigation practice summarized
nicely the reluctance to handle medical malpractice matters:
We don't take any medical malpractice cases. Number one, they are way too technical
for our expertise .... They are also very, very expensive to handle. Easily you can
spend $100,000 without blinking on those kinds of cases and typically we don't have
that kind of cash lying around. We don't have the contacts with the experts in those
kinds of fields. So it's just not something that we do and probably won't ever.
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specialists to organize and run their practices differently when
compared to the non-specialists. This is what our findings from Texas
show. Perhaps most important are differences in how they attract and
screen cases.2 7 While attracting and screening cases are constant
challenges for all plaintiffs' lawyers, the challenges are particularly
acute for the specialist. This is especially so with regard to screening.
Because the specialist is investing a substantial amount of his own
money, he must screen cases with a ruthless eye. For the remainder of
this Part, our focus will be on screening. We will address the second
challenge-attracting cases-in the next Part.
To successfully screen and prepare malpractice cases,
specialists need more specialized office staffs. This is reflected in the
Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey, which shows that 6.0 percent of nonspecialists had at least one nurse on staff, while 35.5 percent of the
malpractice specialists had at least one nurse.
Our interviews,
however, probed more deeply than the survey and indicate that some
malpractice specialists go beyond just having nurses on staff. They
may have either nurse-lawyers or physician-lawyers in their firms,
which allow the specialists to internalize some of the important expert
costs related to the screening and preparation of cases. 28 Others may
have less formal arrangements with such experts, such as retaining
physician-lawyers as "of counsel" to the firm and having that person
at the firm on a regular basis. 29 The specialists also have regular
networks of medical experts to whom they can turn in screening and
preparing cases if they do not literally have such experts on staff.30
The specialists' practices differ in other ways as well. In the
Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey, the size of the malpractice specialists'
practices is smaller than the size of non-specialists' practices as
measured by the number of open cases. On average, the specialists
report having 31.8 open cases at the time of the survey, while non27. Based on a statistical analysis of reported jury verdicts, Bovbjerg and colleagues argue
that plaintiffs' lawyers screen and choose cases based on jury sympathy and damage potential.
See Bovbjerg et al., supra note 1, at 38. The analysis we will present challenges the idea that
sympathy-bias-is a factor. If anything, Texas plaintiffs' lawyers claim, juries are "biased"
against medical malpractice plaintiffs.
28. One specialist reported, "We have nine lawyers now that do almost nothing but medical
malpractice. Two of our lawyers are doctor-lawyers, one is a nurse-lawyer, and we have three
nurse-paralegals."
29. An Austin specialist described such an arrangement: "[We have] a doctor and a lawyer
and he is here on Wednesdays. He is of counsel to our firm. He is an eighteen-year boardcertified ER doctor.., and he reviews our medical cases."
30. As if to echo this, a Houston-area specialist noted, "[W]e have a nurse and a doctor on
staff. Then we have other doctors that consult with us, almost on staff but technically not. That,
I think, is where you make your money as a malpractice lawyer, having ready access to smart
folks who will give you honest answers."
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specialists report 69.4 open cases. 31 However, though this is not
statistically significant, the specialists report getting more calls per
month from prospective clients: on average, the specialists report
32
receiving 24.6 calls per month, compared to 18.3 for non-specialists.
More importantly, the specialists sign significantly fewer calls to a
contract for representation. On average, the specialists report signing
33
up 13.0 percent of calls, while non-specialists sign 27.9 percent.
While the Plaintiffs' Lawyer Survey asked only about calls in general
signed to a contract, our interviews suggest that many specialists
actually accept far fewer than 10 percent of malpractice cases that
34

come to them.
The smaller number of open cases, the larger number of calls,
and especially the much smaller percentage of cases taken all point to
the importance of screening for the specialists. 35 Our interviews
indicate that malpractice specialists are quite stringent in screening
cases and have elaborate and very thorough processes for doing so.
They are often quite adamant in explaining the importance of the
screening process and the investment they make in it.36 Specialists
invest thousands of dollars in deciding whether to take a case, and
that expenditure does not include the internalized costs of having
nurses, nurse-lawyers, or physician-lawyers on staff. The lawyers we
31. The difference of means is statistically significant (sig. at .00).
32. The difference of means is not statistically significant (sig. at.16).
33. The difference of means is statistically significant (sig. at .00).
34. A lawyer with a narrow specialization in brain damage cases said, "We look at 200 cases
now before I take one." Another specialist said that his firm "turned down at least 600 [potential
cases] last year. We probably took in-getting records and screening-about 50, and of those I
think we probably only filed 10 lawsuits last year. I keep my caseloads very small." An Austin
specialist was equally strict, noting that "I was a defense lawyer, I was predominately med mal
defense and I have a pretty good handle on the claims that I think are meritorious." He
estimated that they represented 1 out of 120 of the potential claimants. A Houston lawyer
reported an even stricter screening process through which the firm took, at best, 1 out of 300
potential cases.
35. We have described elsewhere in detail the importance of screening for plaintiffs'
lawyers, including malpractice specialists, and will draw from the discussion here and in the
conclusion. See Daniels & Martin, Texas Two-Step, supra note 12, at 638 ("Acquiring and
screening cases is crucial for plaintiffs' lawyers since their profitability requires an ongoing flow
of clients with injuries that the civil justice system will compensate adequately.").
36. A specialist in Houston explained:
Between 40 and 50 percent of our temporal resources go into saying no to people
who've either lost a family member or have themselves been significantly injured. But
doctors think anyone that's had a complication from a medical procedure, they walk in
here, we file the lawsuit, and then we hold hands and skip over to the courthouse,
raise hell in front of the jury, and the jury shovels millions of dollars in every case.
That's what they're thinking. We have screening criteria for these cases. Last year, I
looked at over 350 cases against health care providers... and we took eleven cases.
A Dallas malpractice specialist made the point succinctly: "I do think an important point is that
we do a hell of a lot of screening of cases that shouldn't be filed."
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interviewed routinely indicate that an initial outlay of at least $10,000
is needed for experts to determine whether to take a medical
malpractice case. This means that specialists may spend thousands of
dollars in deciding not to take a case. This alone may help explain
why a majority of the respondents in the Plaintiffs' Lawyers Survey
report taking no medical malpractice cases and why those who do take
so few. It also suggests that few lawyers, if any, are likely to work on
the "jackpot" basis that is at the heart of the political rhetoric
surrounding malpractice.
Each interview revealed a somewhat different process for
screening malpractice cases, but all of the interview subjects share a
deep concern for determining whether there is likely malpractice and
whether there are substantial damages.
Indeed, specialists are
unlikely to take low-value cases even if there is evidence of
malpractice. The practice of law is, first and foremost, a business that
needs to make a profit, and cases must be seen as being economically
feasible. The remarks of two specialists are typical. The first used the
following example to explain:
I had a case today, that called in and a doctor left a tube in their stomach [after
surgery] ....
The guy was fine, the guy was doing well-he just felt like it was
malpractice... I explained to him that it probably was malpractice, but if he is fine and
dandy, then there is no problem. They opened him up and took the tube out and he's
fine. There is hardly any way economically to pursue a medical malpractice case such
that in the end I will have a happy client. We will pursue the claim and then all the
money will have gone for court reporters and doctors' expenses and testifying and things
of that nature.

The second lawyer said, "[W]e don't take [low value medical
malpractice cases] because the damages may not be of a size that we
can dedicate the office forces to handling ... You just can't stop the
world and handle a $25,000 malpractice case. You just can't do it."
The reason for not taking low-value cases even though there
may be malpractice involved is simple. There must be enough
potential for recovery to pay for the costs of screening the case, the
costs of preparing the case, the costs of actually litigating the case, the
cost of the lawyer's time, and possibly the cost of a referral fee to the
lawyer who brought the case to the specialist. On top of this, there
must be enough financial recovery to help pay for the costs of
screening all of the cases ultimately rejected by the lawyer, as well as
other parts of the lawyer's overhead. 37 The amount of damage
37. According to a San Antonio specialist:
[T]he contingency fees have to offset the amount of money that I put into other cases
or losses that I don't recover ... you have to be very selective. There are a lot of cases
where they are good medical malpractice cases, where there are no damages. . . . [I]t

2006]

PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS

1065

potential varied among the lawyers interviewed, but few are willing to
take anything much below $100,000, and some will take nothing below
$1 million. Trying a case, of course, is even more expensive, and that
38
money comes out of the lawyer's pocket as well.
As to the varying processes used to screen malpractice cases,
all specialists start with some threshold procedure to eliminate as
many callers as possible at the initial contact and determine those in
which it might be worth investing further. One specialist's procedure
illustrates how stringent the screening process can be. First, a nurseparalegal takes the initial call. For a large number of these calls, the
nurse-paralegal tells the caller that what he or she is describing is not
medical malpractice, and things end here. Second, if the nurseparalegal thinks the case might have merit, then she will get
authorization from the potential client to review the medical records,
either on her own or after consulting with one of the physician-lawyers
in the firm. This firm will not take any medical malpractice client
until the medical records have been thoroughly reviewed. Third, once
the medical records are obtained, they are reviewed by one of the
nurse-paralegals and by one of the firm's physician-lawyers. Fourth,
if the initial records review still shows merit, then the records are
reviewed again, this time by the firm's senior physician-lawyer and
the senior partner who heads the medical malpractice litigation
section. Finally, the firm holds a monthly meeting at which those
matters that make it through the review process are discussed. Before
deciding to proceed with something, the firm's medical professionals
must agree that malpractice has been committed and the firm's
lawyers must agree that the litigation components-including the
39
amount of damages-are sufficient to warrant litigation.
takes just as long and just as much expense to try a case that you can recover $10,000
as the one you recover $100,000 in. So you can't do it [run a successful practice] on
that basis.
38. As the San Antonio lawyer quoted in the previous footnote put it:
[W]hen you try a case, you have to pay a physician to come in and testify against
another physician-and the cost, if they come to trial and testify, is between $13,000
and $20,000 a person ... . And those are expenses that your client has to pay out of
any recovery, or you, as the plaintiffs attorney, have to eat if you lose the case.
39. According to the firm's senior partner:
We talk about all of them. There has to be an agreement from the medical side and
from my side-the legal side of it-that we're going to pursue that case-that not only
is the medicine favorable in terms of we believe that there has been a medical screwup but that we can find an expert that will say that, or we've already found an expert
that will say that. At that point, we will have done research through Medline and the
medical journals and the medical texts, and we will have medical literature that says
what was wrong. And then I look at it from a damages standpoint, a venue
standpoint, an economic standpoint. Only if we agree on all of that and basically...
everybody in the room reaches agreement, do we then decide we're going to then get
the client in and sign the client up.
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In summary, we can answer our second question by saying
there are specialists on the plaintiffs' side in the medical malpractice
arena, and the specialists' practices are different from those of other
plaintiffs' lawyers. Particular attention goes to screening cases. Not
all specialists have a process as elaborate as that described in our
illustration or have the in-house expertise that that firm does, but all
screen on both the medical and legal factors with great care. Very few
matters survive any specialist's review process, including some
matters in which malpractice may be evident but the actual damages
are relatively low. As one Austin specialist explained it, "[W]e put up
the money and we put up the time.... I tell my clients exactly what
I'm looking at so that they understand that this has got to be
economically feasible for our firm." The remaining question to answer
is how specialists meet the second key challenge: mobilizing a
clientele. The next Part addresses that question.
IV. How CAN SPECIALISTS MOBILIZE A CLIENTELE?
As we noted earlier, Galanter argues that a major barrier to
the development of real specialization on the plaintiffs' side is the
information problem. 40 How will injured individuals-classic "oneshotters" in Galanter's terms-know who the real specialists are?
How will specialists get cases? Perhaps one way would be through
lawyer advertising. However, Table 5, which presents data from the
Plaintiffs' Lawyers Survey on respondents' sources of business,
demonstrates that advertising is not a major source of business for
medical malpractice specialists. 41 This is not surprising. While
advertising may show consumers which lawyers are interested in
medical malpractice cases, it does not indicate whether they are any
good at it-and this is the key to specialization. Interestingly, it also
shows that advertising is not a major source of business for non42
specialists either.

40. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
41. The differences of all of the means except advertising are statistically significant (sig. at
.02 or better).
42. This is not to say that advertising may not be very important for a small number of
specialists. For instance, one specialist interviewed makes a substantial investment in
aggressive Yellow Pages and television advertising.

2006]

PLAINTIFFS' LAWYERS

1067

Table 5
Sources of Business (mean %)

Lawyer Referrals
Client Referrals

Med Mal Specialists (44)
57.8%
20.6%

Non-Specialists (489)
38.9%
29.5%

Other Referrals
Advertising

7.4%
10.9%

13.4%
12.5%

Other Sources

3.0%

6.6%

Instead, Table 5 indicates that the major source of business for
medical malpractice specialists is lawyer referrals.
Indeed, onequarter of specialists (11 of 44) report getting 90 percent or more of
their business in this way. While injured individuals are unlikely to
know who the real specialists are, lawyers-especially plaintiffs'
lawyers-are likely to know. As one malpractice specialist observed,
almost in direct response to Galanter, "The majority of people don't
have that level of knowledge about who they would go to for a medical
malpractice case. They would go to who their family goes to, their
uncle or who they see on TV, and that lawyer will then bring the case
to us... [P]robably 90% of cases are from lawyers."
Until 2005, Texas allowed for pure referral fees, meaning that
a lawyer could receive a fee for referring a case to another lawyer even
if the first lawyer did no other work on the case. In 2005, Texas
changed the rules on referrals, eliminating pure referral fees but still
allowing for the sharing of fees based on the amount of work
performed by the referring lawyer and the lawyer eventually handling
the matter. 43 In both the old and new schemes, the idea is to provide
economic incentives to move cases-especially complex cases-to the
lawyers best able to handle them. As a Dallas malpractice specialist
put it, "[Tlhe truth of the matter is that it encourages referral to a
specialist." We found that medical malpractice specialists are able to
mobilize a clientele through the referral system.
Table 6 reports on all respondents to the Texas Referral Survey
who are in private practice (the likely source of medical malpractice
referrals). 44 It shows that medical malpractice cases are the most
referred matters in Texas.
They are not, of course, the most
frequently occurring type of case, or even the most frequently

43.

TEX.

DISCIPLINARY

RULES

OF

PROF'L

CONDUCT

R.

1.04

(2005),

available at

http://www.texasbar.com/Content/ContentGroups/Client-Attorney.Assistance 1/Texas-Disciplina
ryRules of ProfessionalConduct/TDRPCEffectiveJunel2005.pdf.
44. See TEXAS REFERRAL SURVEY, supra note 13.
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occurring tort cases. Automobile accident cases are by far the most
frequent tort cases. 45 Many lawyers may be willing to take an
automobile accident case, but most plaintiffs' lawyers, as we have
seen, either take no medical malpractice cases or take very few. We
can assume that other (non-plaintiffs') lawyers would be even more
reluctant to take a medical malpractice case. While lawyers may not
actually want to handle a medical malpractice case, they may be quite
willing to refer such a case for a shared fee if there are lawyers who
are looking for such cases and can handle them successfully. In the
Texas Referral Survey, 42 lawyers report that they accepted at least
one medical malpractice case for which they paid a referral fee to
another lawyer.
Table 6
Top Five Types of Cases Referred with Expectation of a Fee:
All Respondents in Private Practice (N=861)
(Texas Referral Survey)
Type of Case
Medical Malpractice

N of Cases
642

Auto Accident
Products Liability

550
484

Criminal
Employment

344
287

Table 7 shows that for those respondents to the Referral
Survey who had referred at least one medical malpractice case with
the expectation of receiving some kind of fee in return, the most
important reason for that referral was that the case was outside of the
lawyer's practice area. The next most important reason was that the
case was in the lawyer's general practice area but was too complex.
Given the reluctance of many lawyers to handle malpractice cases (as
illustrated in the previous Part), this pattern is exactly what we would
expect to see.

45.

Daniels & Martin, Strange Success, supra note 12, at 1231-32.
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Table 7
Reasons for Referring Medical Malpractice:
All Who Referred at Least One (N=195)
(Texas Referral Survey)
Reason
Out of Practice Area
Too Complex

Percent*
79.0%
44.1%

Geographic Distance
38.5%
Caseload Full
18.5%
Value Too Low
21.0%
Value Too High
12.8%
Most Cases Referred
0.5%
*Percentages will not add to 100%, since respondents were asked to check all that
applied.

Table 8 shows that when lawyers were asked in the Referral
Survey how they chose to whom to refer the case, the most important
reason they gave, by far, is a lawyer's reputation, followed by a
lawyer's compatibility with the client. The size of the referral fee is
far less important. Both our interviews with plaintiffs' lawyers and
the academic literature reinforce the importance of reputation in
attracting referrals. 46 Perhaps the best illustration of this observation
is the statement of an Austin plaintiffs' lawyer we quoted in an earlier
article, a lawyer who aspired to building a practice based on lawyer
referrals of substantial cases:
That's 95% of the game, just getting the case...
In order to get the case.., some
lawyer is going to bring it to you. And the reason he brings it to you is because, at least
in his mind, you have a reputation for being equipped to deal with it, and equipped to
47
get a good result, which is important to him because he's going to get a referral fee.

46. See Daniels & Martin, It's Darwinism, supra note 12, at 380-82 (providing empirical
analysis of how a lawyer's reputation attracts clients and allows for a more profitable practice);
see also Kritzer, supra note 4, at 232-33 (describing how a lawyer's business is developed
through reputation among other lawyers).
47. Daniels & Martin, It's Darwinism, supra note 12, at 387.
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Table 8
Reasons for Choosing the Lawyer:
All Who Referred at Least One Malpractice (N=195)
(Texas Referral Survey)
Reason

Important %

Neutral %

Unimportant %

Size of Fee (189)

11.6%

21.2%

67.2%

Lawyer's Reputation (190)

98.9%

1.1%

0

Reciprocity (186)

16.7%

18.3%

65.1%

Compatibility with Client (184)

56.5%

24.5%

19.0%

Reputation, of course, is about name recognition, and
malpractice specialists must find ways of establishing and
maintaining visibility among other lawyers. Our interviews indicate
that they do so in a number of ways. Some malpractice specialists,
like other lawyers relying upon referrals, engage in sophisticated
More than one specialist told of sending
marketing campaigns.
brochures to other lawyers. For example, one mailed a brochure
summarizing his firm's successes in the malpractice arena to
approximately "50,000 of the 60,000 members of the State Bar of
48
Texas." He reported, "We have referrals from all over the state."
Specialists also enhance their visibility in other ways. All are
careful to make sure that their verdicts appear in the local jury verdict
reporters and in the newspapers. 49 An increasing number of them use
sophisticated websites that tell about their specialization and many
successes, including the size of the awards or settlements attained. In
addition, specialists build and maintain visibility through various
kinds of professional activities and networking. Many are active
members of local, state, and national plaintiffs' lawyers' organizations,
frequently in leadership positions. Others teach continuing education
classes in Texas or appear as speakers at major professional
5
meetings. 0
48. Another specialist mailed a brochure to an estimated 7,000 lawyers "as a marketing
pamphlet.., from Houston south." He said, "We got a lot of phone calls out of that .... It is a
constant reminder of why marketing is important."
49. The lawyer quoted in the previous footnote said: "If we get a big verdict, whether it
makes the newspapers or not, word gets out amongst lawyers and we'll get a big spike on phone
calls .... [Y]ou are always keeping the name out there ... and there's nothing that does that
better than a real good verdict." Another said, "We try to be available to the media when they
want us to talk about an issue. I go out of my way to try to do that and that constitutes some
marketing."
50. One specialist said, "[Iln the past five years I've spoken at [a Texas law school] CLE
program four times [and] for [a trial lawyers organization] three times .... [T]he whole reason is
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Once a referral relationship is established, many specialists
cultivate the relationship with the hope of receiving referrals in the
future if the source is a good one. As one lawyer bluntly put it, "It's
everything [the relationship]. That's our client [the referring lawyer]."
The referral relationship can last for years. 51 The geographic range of
these relationships, once established, can be quite broad. Some cover
particular regions as market niches, while others are simply
statewide.5 2 Of course, specialists in the larger urban centers also
develop ongoing referral relationships with lawyers in their own area.
Specialists meet Galanter's challenge and mobilize a clientele
by mobilizing other lawyers through a referral system that allows the
referral of cases with the expectation of a fee. The fee is everything,
because it provides the economic incentive for lawyers who are less
able to handle medical malpractice cases to move those cases to
lawyers who can handle them. Tables 7 and 8 provide clear support
for the idea that-at least with regard to complex cases like medical
malpractice-the referral system may indeed work to move cases from
less able to more able lawyers. In providing detail on the extensive
efforts specialists make to attract referrals, our interview data
reinforce this idea. In Texas, at least, there is a robust market for
referrals that allows a small number of plaintiffs' lawyers to build
highly specialized practices in medical malpractice litigation.
V. CONCLUSION

The medical malpractice system is quite different from its
characterization in the political rhetoric when we take into
consideration lawyers who specialize in medical malpractice litigation.
It is not a "jackpot" system in which lawyers are willing to take more
and weaker cases in the hopes of winning big. Economically, a
"jackpot" system cannot work for very long for lawyers handling
medical malpractice cases on a contingency fee basis. The lawyers
53
will, quite simply, go broke.

to get your name out there in a legitimate way to a legitimate audience because you are speaking
to all lawyers." At his firm, "we make a commitment to speak at as many legal seminars as we
can. Those are state-wide types of events ....[Y]ou make the circuit."
51. A Dallas specialist noted, "[W]e have some lawyers that frequently refer to us and have
for many years, and then we have lawyers that may just have an occasional case that they send
over."
52. An Austin specialist built ongoing relationships with lawyers in East and West Texas. A
Houston specialist developed referral relationships with lawyers in East Texas, and a San
Antonio specialist developed referral relationships with lawyers in South Texas.
53. As a specialist from San Antonio noted:
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Reforms based on the "jackpot" characterization, such as caps
on non-economic damages, are unlikely to succeed in solving the kinds
of problems identified by the political rhetoric to justify these reforms.
For instance, the political rhetoric talks about doctors leaving the
state, the unavailability of medical services in rural areas, and the
unavailability of services from certain medical specialists anywhere, to
name just a few problems that supposedly will be solved by reforms
like damage caps. Of course, simply because the rhetoric touts certain
goals to gain political support for desired changes, it does not mean
that those are the real targets.
Caps, if they are low enough, may drive the specialists out of
this market or lessen their participation by making it harder for the
specialists to operate in a profitable manner. This is exactly what we
heard in our recent interviews with specialists in the wake of the 2003
enactment of a $250,000 cap on non-economic damages in health care
cases in Texas.
For instance, we re-interviewed a specialist
interviewed a number of years before the 2003 cap (and quoted
previously in this Article). He said that his practice used to consist of
over 90 percent medical malpractice; since the 2003 cap, however, that
ratio has fallen to 60 percent medical malpractice and 40 percent
other contingency fee work. He is not alone, and specialists like him
who have attained a meaningful level of strategic advantage may well
be the real targets of reforms like caps. 54 Such a cap is less likely to
affect the lawyer who handles only one or a few malpractice cases,
since these lawyers are less likely to handle the kinds of cases that
bring awards above the cap limit and are less successful when they do
handle such cases.
Diminishing the participation of the most skilled plaintiffs'
lawyers in the medical malpractice system can have far-reaching
effects. 55 Typically, these lawyers obtain the best settlements, not
only because they are better-than-average negotiators, but also
The practice of plaintiffs' personal injury law is
come in here and we get them big bucks.... I
lawsuits.... I can't imagine from any set of facts
would take a case on a contingency fee that had
[the lawyer] money.

not the lottery; it's not people who
don't know of very many frivolous
how anybody could believe that you
no merit. I mean all it does is cost

54. See Daniels & Martin, Texas Two-Step, supra note 12, at 661-64 (exploring the "possible
effect of the Texas damage cap on" lawyers specializing in med mal); see also Mark Donald,
Access Denied: Does Tort Reform Close Courthouse Doors to Those Who Can Least Afford It?, TEX.
LAW., Jan. 10, 2005, at 1 (describing the decline in profitable medical malpractice work among
Texas lawyers).
55. This paragraph draws from an argument found in Marc Galanter & David Luban,
Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1452-54 (1993).
For a more detailed use of the Galanter and Luban argument in the medical malpractice context,
see also Daniels & Martin, Texas Two-Step, supra note 12, at 663-68.
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because defendants do not want to confront them in jury trials. The
Wisconsin data show that the specialists are more successful, even
against the best defense lawyers. Most cases, of course, settle out of
court, and information about the size of settlements is usually
disseminated among both the plaintiffs' and defense bars. This
information sends signals that govern negotiations in future cases,
because settlement negotiations occur in the "shadow" of past
settlements. It also sends signals that enhance a lawyer's reputation
and attract referrals. If too many good lawyers exit this market, the
shadow shortens, and defendants will be able to bargain harder for
lower settlements. In other words, it may be possible to affect change
in the law itself-in practice-by attacking specialists and altering the
market for their services.

